



**Central  
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# National Intelligence Daily

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**POLAND-  
WEST GERMANY:****Foreign Minister Genscher's Trip**

*West German Foreign Minister Genscher's visit to Poland early next week is far more important to Warsaw than to Bonn, but the benefits for Polish leader Jaruzelski will probably be more political than economic. Genscher wants to reassure the Poles about the implications of improved intra-German relations and improve Bonn's reputation in Poland.*

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Warsaw gave ground on several longstanding issues in arranging the visit. The trip was originally scheduled for July 1987 but postponed when Polish demands for war reparations angered Genscher. The visit was rescheduled after Bonn's formal refutation of the war claims went unchallenged and the Poles decided to allow Genscher's delegation to make contacts with opposition leaders and to lay wreaths at a World War I German grave site in Poland.

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**Comment:** For Warsaw, the visit caps a year of improving bilateral relations, through exchanges and visits. Warsaw will seek Bonn's help in modernizing Polish industry and West German support for efforts to get new credits and lower interest rates from other Western creditors. It may push for expanding scientific and technological cooperation in such areas as the environment.

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The Poles will also use the visit to further Moscow's "European house" strategy, emphasizing Poland's role as a bridge between East and West. The regime will tout its internal reforms as an example of enlightened rule now permitted by General Secretary Gorbachev. Jaruzelski's plan to reduce conventional arms in Europe will be given prominence. The Poles also want a statement reaffirming the inviolability of Polish and German borders as ratified in a 1970 treaty.

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Polish hopes for greatly expanded economic cooperation are likely to go unfulfilled. Bonn contends that Warsaw's economic problems require IMF or other multilateral assistance, but it appears ready to move forward on political issues. Genscher sees the visit partly as a new phase of detente and partly as a way to his domestic popularity. He may seek a joint communique endorsing asymmetrical reductions in conventional and short-range nuclear forces, as well as an East-West economic conference.

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Genscher will try to reassure the Poles that improved intra-German relations are not a threat to Warsaw. He will stress that revanchist sentiment in West Germany is negligible and seek assurances of his own for the rights of ethnic Germans in Poland. Other items on the German agenda are largely symbolic: to increase cultural youth exchanges, to set up an exhibit at Auschwitz depicting German opposition to the Nazi regime, and to preserve an estate in Poland associated with the German resistance to Hitler.

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**OMAN: Vigilance Against Radical Shias**

Recent radical Shia activity in Oman has prompted Muscat to take security measures to disrupt clandestine Shia organizations.

[redacted] members of two pro-Iranian Shia cells have been trained in Iran for terrorist operations and maintain contact with Tehran. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Pro-Iranian Shias are few in number and have become active primarily because of Iranian support. The small size of the Omani Shia community—less than 5 percent of the population—and its traditional links to the sultanate limit support for the radicals. Moreover, Muscat has become more vigilant in monitoring Shia dissidents since the US escort program in the Persian Gulf began. The Omani Government has limited radical Shia activity through infiltration of Shia organizations and close surveillance of key members. Muscat will crack down harder on the radicals and their supporters in the Shia community if Sultan Qaboos perceives an increased threat to Omani, British, or US interests. [redacted]

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**CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Party Changes Imminent**

Milos Jakes will make his first trip to Moscow as Czechoslovak General Secretary on Monday and will discuss "party issues and economic plans." He will preside over a central committee plenum shortly after his return to Prague, according to US Embassy information [redacted] rumors of imminent major personnel changes. [redacted]

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**Comment:** In Moscow, Jakes is sure to discuss his plans for shuffling party and government posts. He will then probably try to make at least some personnel changes at the plenum to reinforce his position and authority. At a minimum, a new party economics secretary probably will be named. He might also try to add members to the Presidium. Dismissals are less likely, because of the need to maintain political and ethnic balances in the top leadership and Central Committee conservatism. Jakes and General Secretary Gorbachev will probably also discuss bilateral economic relations and possibly reach specific agreements for further joint projects and increased integration of their economies. [redacted]

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**In Brief****East Asia**

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- **South Korean** ruling party acceding to opposition demands to postpone early National Assembly elections . . . new date—after President-elect Roh's inauguration 25 February—to be set in talks with opposition over new parliamentary laws. [ ]

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**Europe**

- **French** Prime Minister Chirac may declare candidacy for April presidential election at special party congress on 24 January . . . early announcement intended to pressure President Mitterrand, conservative rival Barre, to clarify intentions . . . also hopes to boost flagging prospects. [ ]
- **Bulgaria** devaluing currency by one-third for Western visitors, new rates for foreign trade reportedly to follow . . . trying to increase hard currency earnings but currency still far overvalued. [ ]

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
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**Special Analysis****SOUTH AFRICA:****Zulu Leader Buthelezi Under Fire**

***Continuing black factional violence in South Africa's Natal Province has further poisoned relations between moderate Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi and the more radical black opposition and undermined Buthelezi's claim to undisputed leadership of the Zulus, South Africa's largest black tribe. Pretoria probably will attempt to exploit the turmoil by pressing Buthelezi harder to participate in an advisory National Council for blacks. But Buthelezi is unlikely to drop his demand that African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela be released as a precondition for his participation on the council.***

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Efforts by Buthelezi's Inkatha organization to counter the growing influence of the opposition United Democratic Front in largely Zulu Natal led to clashes, which are not likely to abate soon. Some 300 blacks have been killed in the fighting since August. Although both Buthelezi and the UDF have called for an end to the violence, each side says its members are merely defending themselves. Efforts to mediate have been ineffective, and both groups have been embarrassed by an inability to control their members.

The continued fighting reflects wide differences between Buthelezi and the more radical black opposition.

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- The UDF—South Africa's largest antiapartheid organization—considers Buthelezi a collaborator because of his position as leader of South Africa's KwaZulu homeland, his denunciation of ANC, and his opposition to international economic sanctions.
- Buthelezi has accused the ANC and the UDF of orchestrating the violence in an attempt to discredit Inkatha and the Buthelezi-supported Indaba plan—a proposal for a multiracial provincial government joining Natal and KwaZulu that has been opposed by Pretoria.

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**Government Calculations**

The government has taken a few steps to end the factional fighting but is under increasing pressure from

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Natal's white community to use the police more aggressively to restore order. Such police actions as detaining regional UDF leaders involved in talks to end the fighting have sharpened the conflict and reinforced UDF claims that Inkatha collaborates with the government.

Pretoria has attempted to use the bad publicity Inkatha has received from the fighting to discredit the Indaba plan and to increase public pressure on Buthelezi to participate instead in its National Council for blacks. The government has touted the council as the first step toward black political participation at the national level, but virtually all credible black leaders have rejected it.

Pretoria probably believes a weakened Buthelezi would drop some of his preconditions for joining the council, such as the demand for the release of Mandela. Pretoria believed Buthelezi would negotiate following the release of ANC official Govan Mbeki last November, and the government probably still expects to entice Buthelezi with only minimal concessions.

### Implications and Outlook


The violence has drawn attention to the increasingly stark dilemma facing Buthelezi. Although he will probably always have the support of many traditional Zulus, his hold on the more urbanized part of his constituency will continue to weaken because of Pretoria's failure to address his demands. At the same time, Buthelezi risks facing even greater problems if he makes too many concessions to Pretoria.

Although the UDF has proved it is a major player in Buthelezi's Natal stronghold, its inability to deliver on a cease-fire has also demonstrated its organizational weakness. Senior UDF leaders are concerned that, if they cannot marshal local support for an agreement with Inkatha, the group's success in the region might be undone by a security crackdown.

The UDF-Inkatha battle has served Pretoria's interests by keeping the black opposition divided, but the government probably was surprised by the extent of the violence. The security forces are likely to launch soon a major effort to restore order and reassure whites that it can control black violence. Although a government crackdown will probably reduce violence, it will also expose Buthelezi and Inkatha to new charges of collaboration with Pretoria.

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